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ABSTRACT
In 2011 South Africa led the UN Human Rights Council to adopt the first-ever UN resolution on
sexual orientation. In 2014, South Africa was the only African state to support the follow-up to
the 2011 resolution. These actions create the impression that South Africa is strongly
committed to the international advancement of sexual orientation rights. However, this
article scrutinises South Africa’s actions on sexual orientation rights at the UN for the
period 1995–2015 and will demonstrate South Africa’s inconsistency, its frequent failures to
support sexual orientation rights internationally, and its various actions against the
advancement of these rights. The article sets South Africa’s behaviour on sexual orientation
rights against broader questions of the place of human rights in South African foreign
policy and South Africa’s international leadership.
Introduction
At the 1995 United Nations (UN) Women’s Conference in Beijing, South Africa came out
strongly against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation (Girard 2004, 341).
When various African delegations confronted South Africa about raising the topic of
sexual orientation, South Africa brushed them off with the explanation that the country’s
constitution prohibited discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation (Member of South
African delegation to Beijing, Interview, 20 May 2014). In June 2011, South Africa led the
UN Human Rights Council (HRC) to adopt resolution 17/19, ‘Human rights, sexual orien-
tation and gender identity’ (UNHRC 2011a), the first-ever UN resolution on sexual orien-
tation. Before the resolution, South Africa had to withstand scathing criticism from
other African countries, and the spokesperson for the African Group even had to be
called to order for his claim that 90% of South Africans did not support their country’s res-
olution (Nigeria 2011). Mauritius was the only African state – out of 13 – to vote for resol-
ution 17/19.1 In the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly (GA), the biennial
resolution on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions has for years been a battle-
ground over sexual orientation rights. In November 2012, in response to a motion from
the United Arab Emirates to remove the terms ‘sexual orientation and gender identity’
from the resolution (UNGA 2012a, 2012b), South Africa spoke and voted for retaining
the words (UNGA 2012c). In September 2014, the HRC adopted a second resolution on
sexual orientation and gender identity (SOGI), resolution 27/32 (UNHRC 2014a). South
Africa was the only African state to vote for the resolution and against the seven hostile
amendments that preceded the final vote.
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The examples above seem to bookend two decades of courageous and committed
South African effort against discrimination and violence against lesbian, gay, bisexual,
and transgender (LGBT) persons. During the adoption of resolution 17/19, the South
African ambassador spoke as if democratic South Africa’s foreign policy had always
been true to the belief ‘that no one should be subjected to discrimination or violence
based on their sexual orientation or gender identity’ (South Africa 2011b). However,
close observers of human rights and sexual orientation matters at the UN, in this case
the Coalition of African Lesbians (CAL), noted that prior to resolution 17/19 South Africa
had for years held ‘troubling and inconsistent positions’ on SOGI issues (HRW 2011a).
For CAL, resolution 17/19 was a reorientation and held the promise that South Africa
might provide ‘sustained progressive leadership’ on the issue (HRW 2011a). On the face
of it, South Africa’s support for the aforementioned 2014 SOGI resolution suggests that
South Africa had maintained its progressive stance after resolution 17/19.
Very little has been written about South Africa’s positions on SOGI at the UN, and what
exists usually focuses on specific events or votes, leaving the frequency and extent of
South Africa’s ‘inconsistent and troubling’ positions prior to resolution 17/19 unarticulated.
There has also been very little coverage of South Africa’s record after resolution 17/19, with
the little that exists focusing on South Africa’s failure to organise an African workshop on
SOGI, the significance of which will be explained in a later section, and uncertainty about
how South Africa was going to vote on the September 2014 SOGI resolution (Sonke
Gender Justice 2014; Thamm 2014).
This article examines democratic South Africa’s positions on the theme of human rights
and sexual orientation at the UN. The focus falls on important nodes in the struggle over
sexual orientation rights at the UN since South Africa’s democratisation: the 1995 Women’s
Conference in Beijing; resolutions related to the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial,
summary or arbitrary executions; Brazil’s 2003 draft resolution on sexual orientation,
and various events in the HRC after March 2011. Author interviews with diplomats, activists
and international civil servants familiar with SOGI issues at the UN,2 as well as other sources
such as UN records, news reporting and NGO statements, are harnessed to present a
thorough view of South Africa’s commitment, or lack thereof, to SOGI-related human
rights at the UN.
Beyond bringing to the fore an issue that has received little attention, an examination of
South Africa’s record on SOGI is also important because it is part of the broader question of
the place of human rights in South African foreign policy. Mandela (1993, 88) famously
declared that human rights would guide South Africa’s future foreign policy. Although
human rights were soon demoted (Jordaan 2012; Smith 2015; Zondi 2009), South
African policy documents and policy-makers have continued to proclaim their centrality
to South African foreign policy. (Alden and Schoeman 2013, 116; Ebrahim 2014; Fransman
2012; South Africa DIRCO 2013, 4; Smith 2016), as have academic observers. Brysk (2009,
171, 196), for instance, regards South Africa as a ‘principled exporter of human rights’. In a
review of South Africa’s foreign policy, a group of respected commentators found little
fault with the content of South Africa’s international positions on human rights – it is
motivated by an ‘ethical rationale’ – but rather identified the foreign ministry’s clumsy
public relations and engagement with the international media as the problem (Le Pere
2008, 16–17).
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However, by the late 2000s, such affirmative assessments of the place of human rights
in South African foreign policy have become hard to sustain (Bischoff 2009; Jordaan 2010).
In 2009 Kenneth Roth, executive director of Human Rights Watch, pointed out that
because of South Africa’s foreign policy positions, some so out of date that not even
China or Russia were using them anymore, the human rights community had come to
regard South Africa as a ‘huge disappointment and no longer an ally’ (US Government
2009a). South Africa’s record on human rights subsequent to Roth’s intervention has
remained poor (Jordaan 2016, 25; Killander 2016, 49; Smith 2016, 18). In a review of
South Africa’s actions on the HRC from 2006 to 2012, Jordaan (2014a, 92) concludes
that, despite the occasional exception, South Africa is a defender of oppressive govern-
ments and an obstacle to the international advancement of human rights (also Jordaan
2014b, 2015). This has continued to be the case since South Africa re-joined the HRC in
2014 (Allison 2014). As the Economist (2015) recently summed it up, South Africa’s
human rights foreign policy is ‘clueless and immoral’.
These general assessments of human rights in South African foreign policy have paid
almost no attention to sexual orientation issues.3 The inclusion of SOGI matters stand to
influence our assessment of South Africa’s human rights foreign policy, for better or for
worse. Incorporating SOGI matters in such an evaluation seems particularly relevant as res-
olution 17/19 marked a turning point. In the context of a discussion of this resolution, held
in September 2011, the director-general of Department of International Relations and
Cooperation (DIRCO), Jerry Matjila, acknowledged that South Africa had previously
failed to protect human rights in the country’s foreign policy. This omission, Matjila prom-
ised, would be changed: diplomats were reminded that ‘the Bill of Rights is your Bible’
(Fabricius 2011). Furthermore, South Africa’s leadership on resolution 17/19 allowed the
country to cast itself as a moral actor committed to doing the ‘right thing’ even at the
cost of good relations with allies (Fabricius 2011). South Africa’s contribution on resolution
17/19 also changed the perception of civil society, with the human rights community
again regarding South Africa as a viable international partner (HRW 2011a). Finally, resol-
ution 17/19 also pointed to improved relations with the West, at least on the HRC. Prior to
this June 2011 resolution, South Africa had only once voted with the bulk of the Western
countries – in June 2006 – on an issue on which the HRC was substantially split (Jordaan
2014b, 247).
What will surface, in terms of South Africa’s commitment to SOGI rights, is that after the
1995UNWomen’s Conference in Beijing until before theHRC’s June 2011 session the overall
pattern is of South Africa’s weakening support for SOGI rights at the UN to a point where the
country becomes an opponent of these rights. Resolution 17/19 marked a sharp change of
direction. This new course was sustained until the end of 2012, but in 2013 South Africa’s
commitment began to waver until it reached the low of South Africa voting in favour of
an anti-SOGI resolution at the June 2014 session of the HRC.
An investigation of South Africa’s SOGI positions at the UN is important, secondly, for
allowing us to assess South Africa’s international leadership. Expectations of leadership
are presents in characterisations of South Africa as an ‘emerging state’, an ‘emerging
power’, a ‘Southern power’ (Cooper and Flemes 2013; Heine 2010), a ‘rising power’
(Ebert and Maurer 2013), and an ‘emerging regional power’ (Alden and Vieira 2005, Nel
2010). According to Alden and Schoeman (2013, 111), South Africa is a leader of Africa,
‘a credible leader of the South’, and ‘capable also of global leadership’. Moreover, the
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regular characterisation of South Africa as a ‘middle power’ (Hamill and Lee 2001; Jordaan
2012; Schoeman 2000; Van der Westhuizen 1998, 2013) is meant to draw attention to
South Africa’s prominence in trying to solve global problems and conflicts, as well as
the country’s tendency to act as a mediator, catalyst, facilitator, manager or bridge-
builder when addressing international problems (Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal 1993, 24–
25; Neack 2013, 58).
With a constitution that was one of the first to outlaw discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation, while simultaneously enjoying close links with Africa and the rest of
the Global South, South Africa has been well placed to act as a mediator between inter-
national opponents and proponents of SOGI rights. However, after a forceful performance
at the 1995 Beijing conference, South Africa showed little interest in leading on SOGI. Only
in December 2010 in the GA did South Africa step up. Three months later, South Africa
launched an initiative, but it took the form of an anti-SOGI resolution and ended in
failure. Another three months later, South Africa led the HRC to adopt resolution 17/19,
which mandated an Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)
report and a panel discussion thereof. These mandated tasks were completed in March
2012. Further action on SOGI depended to a great extent on South Africa, the recognised
leader on SOGI at the HRC, but its leadership withered into inaction and unreliability.
Before proceeding, it will be helpful to ask what motivates South Africa’s SOGI positions
at the UN. South Africa’s considerable inconsistency on the issue, which will be demon-
strated, suggests that various factors are at work. South Africa’s inconsistency also takes
a number of explanations off the table. The various sharp, quick turns in South Africa’s
SOGI positions over a period of 20 years mean that South Africa’s international positions
cannot be explained as a reflection of changes in domestic law and policy, which have
gradually become more progressive (HRW 2011b). It is also not helpful to separate the
Mandela, Mbeki and Zuma eras in terms of their SOGI positions. During the Mandela’s pre-
sidency, South Africa strongly supported human rights related to sexual orientation at the
Beijing Conference, but during his tenure there were hardly any events where this commit-
ment could play out; the topic of sexual orientation began to come up more frequently in
the 2000s (International Commission of Jurists 2007). Under Mbeki and Zuma, South Africa
often strayed from supporting SOGI rights, but South Africa’s inconsistency under both
Mbeki and Zuma makes it difficult to distinguish these two presidencies on SOGI matters.
Seeing South Africa’s actions on SOGI as reflective of broader historical trends does not
take us very far. To be sure, the growing international recognition of LGBT rights helped
South Africa to get resolution 17/19 adopted. Brazil failed to have a weaker sexual orien-
tation resolution adopted in 2003, but South Africa’s frequent flip-flopping meant that at
time it also acted against broader historical trends. Rather, it seems as if events in the UN,
whether scheduled or ad hoc, were more significant spurs to action.
South African diplomats cite their country’s history and its constitution as the inspi-
ration for their support for SOGI rights (South Africa 2014). However, South Africa’s
unevenness on and frequent failure to support SOGI rights mean that foreign policy-
makers frequently ignored the country’s historical and constitutional dictates. Moreover,
at times South Africa used a reference to its liberal constitution to obscure its support
for an illiberal position (South Africa 2010a).
South Africa’s inconsistency and the lack of a clear long-term policy on SOGI it implies
make the country’s specific SOGI stances relatively sensitive to influence from those close
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to the issue. Specific South African diplomats are one such source, as are other South
African ministries. Civil society has also tried to shape South Africa’s actions on SOGI,
although with mixed success (Girard 2004, 347). Moreover, pro-SOGI civil society is not
monolithic, a fact South Africa has exploited to its own advantage.
Two further factors feature. The ‘anti-imperialist’ tenor of South African foreign policy
has frequently been noted (Jordaan 2010; Nathan 2005; Zondi 2009). On resolution 17/
19 and other pro-SOGI initiatives, South Africa stood on the same side as Western
states, a rare event on the HRC (Jordaan 2014b, 247). On the HRC, Western states often
regard South Africa as an ‘unfriendly’ delegation and as having the wrong friends
(Allison 2014; Donahoe 2013; US Government 2009b; Western diplomat, Interview, Febru-
ary 14, 2014). South Africa’s anti-imperial proclivities and the country’s sense that its
purpose is to defend the developing world on occasion shine through in the country’s
treatment of SOGI matters.
A final factor concerns South Africa’s relations with Africa. As voting records and
speeches show, at the UN the majority of African states oppose linking sexual orientation
with human rights. On SOGI, South Africa faces a choice: support the human rights of LGBT
persons in UN forums or maintain good relations with African states. On SOGI, South Africa
has been under pressure from African states to eschew progressive positions. After resol-
ution 17/19 South Africa suffered isolation from the African Group and ‘lost’ some allies
(Fabricius 2011), which echoes Smith’s broader claim that ‘[p]erhaps the strongest influ-
ence on South Africa’s human rights stance is its troubled relationship with the rest of
the African continent’ (Smith 2016, 20). At the same time, pressure out of Africa is not ines-
capable. Moreover, African states do not form amonolithic bloc. In a study of South Africa’s
record on the HRC, Jordaan (2014a, 101–109) points to numerous instances of other
African countries acting in a more pro-human rights way than South Africa. This means
that South Africa has room for manoeuvre. The same applies to SOGI. The discussion
below will indicate a number of examples of other African states at times adopting
more pro-SOGI positions than South Africa, as well as of South Africa acting in a more
pro-SOGI way than a majority of African states. Therefore, while resistance from some
African states helps to explain cases of South Africa’s anti-SOGI behaviour, it does not
explain it fully.
The 1995 UN Women’s Conference in Beijing
In the first years of its democracy, South Africa strongly supported the international pro-
tection of rights related to sexual orientation. The UN Fourth World Conference on
Women, held in Beijing in September 1995, was significant because it is where the
‘first open discussion of the issue [of sexual orientation] in the UN’ took place (Bunch
and Fried 1996, 202). In a plenary address, a South African representative of the
Lesbian Caucus, an advocacy alliance, spoke about the discrimination lesbians face
and called for the recognition that ‘discrimination based on sexual orientation is a viola-
tion of basic human rights’ (Ditsie 1995). During the ensuing debate, the Holy See, some
Catholic and Islamic countries, and various African countries (including Benin, Cote
d’Ivoire, Senegal, Sudan and Uganda) opposed the mention of sexual orientation.
However, South Africa was one of more than 30 countries to support the mention of
sexual orientation, with South Africa making ‘a particularly strong appeal’ to end all
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discrimination and to include ‘sexual orientation’ in the conference’s final document
(Girard 2004, 340).
An important part of the Beijing Conference was the lengthy process to produce a
document on the rights of women, the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action. The
39th session of the UN Commission on the Status of Women, held in New York during
March–April 1995, was the final preparatory meeting for the Beijing Conference. The
New York meeting had been preceded by five regional conferences (Otto 1995, 289).
The European regional conference was the only one to include a reference to ‘sexual orien-
tation’ in the document it brought to New York (UNCSW 1995; also Otto 1995, 289), but at
the New York meeting South Africa added its voice to those who wanted to include refer-
ence to sexual orientation (Sanders 1996, 90). Although bracketed, meaning there was still
no consensus on the text, the draft Beijing Platform for Action contained four references to
sexual orientation (UN 1995d).
At the Beijing Conference, during negotiations on the final document, discussions on
sexual rights proceeded along one track, and discussions of sexual orientation along
another, separate track (Girard 2004, 337). Most African states strongly supported the
notion of sexual rights given the continent’s severe problems with HIV-AIDS and violence
against women (Klugman 2000, 152). What was to become paragraph 96 of the Beijing
Platform was adopted a few days before the end of the conference (Girard 2004, 338).
According to paragraph 96, the ‘human rights of women include their right to have
control over and decide freely and responsibly on matters related to their sexuality’ (UN
1995a, 36). South Africa strongly supported the inclusion of sexual orientation in the
Beijing platform and understood the above-quoted part of paragraph 96 to include ‘the
right to be free from coercion, discrimination and violence based on sexual orientation’
(UN 1995a, 171). However, other African states did not understand the text in this way
(Girard 2004, 338). The adoption of paragraph 96 required ‘obfuscation’ of the sexual
orientation aspect (Klugman quoted in Girard 2004, 338), because, had it been explicitly
interpreted as freedom from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, African
countries (excluding South Africa) would have withdrawn their support (Klugman 2000,
159).
Rights regarding sexual orientation thus received some coverage under the umbrella of
sexual rights, but there were also direct negotiations about sexual orientation. These were
still taking place on the final night of the conference, but, in the end, all references to the
term were removed. South Africa wanted to retain the references (Otto 1995, 289) and
thus issued, along with a number of other countries, an interpretative statement to say
that they understood the reference to discrimination against women of ‘other status’, in
paragraph 46 of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (UN 1995b), to include dis-
crimination on the basis of sexual orientation (Otto 1996, 26).
Despite the deletion of explicit reference to sexual orientation, the wording of para-
graph 96 is regarded as a victory for lesbian women. In the years that followed the
Beijing Conference, there was a strong conservative pushback at the UN against the
sexual rights provisions in the Beijing Platform. At the 5-year and 10-year follow-up
meetings to the Beijing Conference, women’s groups could do little more than ‘hold
the line on the modest language won in the 1990s’ (Corrêa, Petchesky, and Parker
2008, 164). At the five-year review conference, held in New York in 2000, conservatives
kept the phrases ‘sexual orientation’ and ‘sexual rights’ out of the Conference outcome
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document. However, South Africa was among those who exerted ‘strong pressure’ to
retain language such as ‘and other status’ and ‘full diversity of women’s conditions
and situations’ in order to cover sexual orientation. Moreover, South Africa also
helped to ensure that the language from Paragraph 96 that covered sexual orientation
remained in the outcome document (Girard 2000). At the 10-year review conference,
South Africa’s foreign minister did not explicitly mention sexual orientation, but never-
theless spoke of the importance of a ‘focus’ on the sexual rights of women (Dlamini-
Zuma 2005).
The 1995 Women’s Conference in Beijing marks a high point in South Africa’s defence
of sexual orientation rights. In light of South Africa’s waning willingness to push for or
simply support sexual orientation rights during the 2000s, it helps to note that the
Beijing conference took place in the heady atmosphere of South Africa’s recent democra-
tisation and the triumph of human rights over apartheid. Indeed, at Beijing, South Africa
saw itself as ‘carrying the flag for human rights’ (Member of South African delegation to
Beijing, Interview, 20 May 2014). As noted in the introduction, South Africa’s initial commit-
ment to a human rights-centred foreign policy soon gave way and South Africa became
‘just another country’ (Vale and Taylor 1999, 630).
Resolutions on the special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or
arbitrary executions
The special procedures system is central to the UN’s work on human rights (Piccone 2012,
4–5). This mechanism entails the appointment of experts or groups of experts to investi-
gate the human rights situation in a specific country or on a specific theme. The issue of
sexual orientation has increasingly appeared in the reports and communications of various
special procedures, such as mandates addressing arbitrary detention, racism, forced disap-
pearances, human rights defenders, the right to health, judicial independence, torture, vio-
lence against women, the right to adequate housing, the right to education and a few
others (ARC International 2011a, 5–6).
One special procedures mandate, the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary
or arbitrary executions, has been a focal point for disagreements in the UN over
sexual orientation. Resolutions on this mandate have been the only UN resolutions,
except for the two SOGI resolutions that followed later, that mention the term
‘sexual orientation’ (ISHR 2012). While special procedures reports had begun to
mention violence and discrimination against sexual minorities in the mid-1990s (Inter-
national Commission of Jurists 2007), the 1999 report of the Special Rapporteur on
extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions was a landmark for devoting a section
to ‘the right to life and sexual orientation’, and for special rapporteur expressing
‘deep concern’ over various reports ‘of persons having been killed or sentenced to
death because of their sexual orientation’ and speaking out against the criminalisation
of matters related to sexual orientation (UNCHR 1999, 26; see also UNCHR 2000a, 21–
22). Resolutions on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions are tabled in two UN
human rights forums: the GA Third Committee) and the UN Commission on Human
Rights (CHR)/HRC.4 Mention of ‘sexual orientation’ can be found in CHR resolutions,
but in HRC resolutions the term does not appear explicitly, but refers to GA resolutions
that do contain the term (UNHRC 2008; UNHRC 2011b).
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In the CHR, the term ‘sexual orientation’ first appeared in the resolution on extrajudicial,
summary or arbitrary executions in 2000. The resolution expressed ‘concern’ over the
killing of persons ‘because of their sexual orientation’ (UNCHR 2000b). The 2000 resolution
was adopted by consensus. However, the next year, Finland, introducing the draft resol-
ution, removed the reference to sexual orientation and replaced it with a reference to
killing committed ‘for any discriminatory reason’, most likely to ensure that the resolution
was adopted by consensus (UNCHR 2001, 13). However, in 2002, the term ‘sexual orien-
tation’ reappeared, the sponsors of the resolution now willing to forego a consensual
adoption of the resolution. The 2002 draft resolution called for proper investigations
into cases where people had been killed because of their sexual orientation and asked
the special rapporteur to pay specific attention to such cases (UNCHR 2002a). Pakistan pro-
posed removing the 2 references to sexual orientation, but its proposed amendment was
defeated 28–15 (9 abstentions). South Africa was one of six African countries to abstain.5
The resolution was then adopted, with South Africa voting in favour (UNCHR 2002b, 481–
482). In 2003, the draft resolution again contained a reference to sexual orientation. Paki-
stan requested a separate vote on the paragraph that contained the reference (UNCHR
2003a). The paragraph was retained by a vote of 27–10 (15 abstentions). South Africa
was one of nine African countries to abstain. The resolution was then adopted, with
South Africa voting in favour (UNCHR 2003b, 407–408). In 2004, the pattern repeated
itself (UNCHR 2004, 412–414). In 2005, Pakistan returned to trying to delete the reference
to sexual orientation through an amendment. However, Pakistan’s amendment was
rejected in a close vote (25–20, 7 abstentions). South Africa abstained on the amendment,
but voted for the resolution, which was adopted (UNCHR 2005, 14–18).
The term ‘sexual orientation’ first appeared in the biennial GA resolutions on extrajudi-
cial, summary or arbitrary executions in December 2002. The 2002 resolution reminded
governments to effectively protect the right to life of all persons under their jurisdiction
and to ‘promptly and thoroughly’ investigate, among others, ‘all killings committed for
any discriminatory reason, including sexual orientation’ (UNGA 2003). Since 2002, the
inclusion of the term ‘sexual orientation’ has constantly come under challenge through
proposals in the GA Third Committee to remove mention of sexual orientation. These chal-
lenges are typically voted down, but in November 2010 a hostile amendment was success-
ful in a Third Committee vote, only for the term to be restored one month later during a
vote in the full GA.
South Africa’s voting record in the GA on amendments to delete the reference to sexual
orientation has been erratic. In 2002, South Africa was one of the 13 African countries to
abstain, whereas 15 African countries voted to retain the reference, and 16 mostly Islamic
African countries voted for deletion (UNGA 2002, 21–22). In 2004, South Africa was 1 of 9
African countries to abstain, whereas 10 voted to retain the reference and 19 voted to
remove it (UNGA 2004, 20–21). In 2006, the African Group voted very differently, with
20 voting to retain the reference (including South Africa), 12 abstaining, and only 8
voting to remove the reference (UNGA 2006, 22). In 2008, the bulk of the African Group
went the other way, as 28 African states (including South Africa) voted for removing the
reference, 13 abstained, and only 3 opposed removal (UNGA 2008, 20–22). In November
2010, South Africa and 39 other African states were among those that succeeded in remov-
ing the term ‘sexual orientation’ in Third Committee vote.6 South Africa argued that the
African Group’s proposal to replace the words ‘any discriminatory reason, including
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sexual orientation’ with ‘discriminatory reasons on any basis’ provided ‘comprehensive
non-discrimination’ (UNGA 2010a). South Africa further employed one of the standard
arguments used by states hostile to sexual orientation rights, namely that there was no
international agreement on the definition of ‘sexual orientation’. South Africa called for
a formal process to define the term and to establish how it fitted into international
human rights law (UNGA 2010a). However, when, in December 2010, the United States
proposed reinserting a reference to sexual orientation, South Africa changed sides and
voted in support of reinsertion. Only 4 other African countries supporting reinserting
the term, 29 were opposed and 10 abstained (UNGA 2010b, 19–20).7
South Africa’s support for reinserting the term was grudging. South Africa lamented
that the issue remained controversial and divisive, for which it ‘partly’ blamed Western
states, specifically, ‘for to the manner in which delegations have raised it in connection
with all the different agenda items related to human rights’ (UNGA 2010b, 16). Further-
more, South Africa’s explanation of its about-turn was full of misrepresentation. South
Africa repeated the claim that the African Group’s amendment in November 2010 ‘was
broad enough to not require specifying sexual orientation over the numerous other poss-
ible grounds for discrimination’. South Africa went on to say that the US’s proposed
reinsertion of the words ‘sexual orientation’ had ‘nothing to do’ with the amendment
South Africa had supported in November 2010 (UNGA 2010b, 16). This is blatantly false:
on both occasions the issue was whether to include a reference to sexual orientation. In
December 2010, South Africa was willing to vote for the US amendment because it
sought ‘to provide a very significant protection to a category of people who are killed
because of their sexual orientation’ (UNGA 2010b, 16). Such protection is indeed what
the November 2010 draft resolution was after.
In both 2012 and 2014, South Africa opposed the removal of the reference to ‘sexual
orientation’ and gender identity. In 2012, South Africa and 5 other African states
opposed removing the phrase, while 14 African states favoured removal and 19 abstained.
South Africa also spoke up, stressing the vulnerability of sexual minorities (UNGA 2012c). In
2014, the African Group moved in a regressive direction during the vote on whether to
remove the SOGI reference. South Africa stood firm as one of only 2 African states to
oppose removing the reference, while 25 favoured removal and 10 abstained.
The discussion above demonstrated that up to 2005, South Africa failed to support SOGI
rights in the GA and CHR. Opposition to the issue in the late 2000s, in turn followed by
strong support for SOGI in 2012 and 2014, followed South Africa’s supportive vote in
2006. This section further drew attention to various instances in the GA of other African
states being more supportive of sexual orientation rights than South Africa. Finally, this
section showed South Africa’s haphazardness. On the same issue, South Africa abstained
in 2004, voted in favour in 2006, voted against in 2008 and November 2010, and voted in
favour in December 2010 and in 2012 and 2014.
Brazil’s resolution
In 2003, Brazil tabled the resolution ‘Human Rights and Sexual Orientation’ in the CHR, the
first-ever UN draft resolution on sexual orientation. The resolution framed sexual orien-
tation in terms of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, expressed ‘deep concern’
about violence against persons because of their sexual orientation, called on states to
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protect and promote the human rights of all persons regardless of sexual orientation, and
asked relevant special procedures mandate holders and the High Commissioner for
Human Rights to pay attention to rights violations based on sexual orientation (UNCHR
2003c). While the resolution led to increased mobilisation at the UN in support of the
issue, opponents also mobilised (Girard 2004, 345–346, 353; Karsay 2014, 8), with polaris-
ation the result. Although there was no vote on whether to adopt the resolution, there
were three votes on attempts to thwart discussing the resolution. South Africa abstained
on two of these votes and once voted with opponents of the resolution.
Brazil tabled its resolution on sexual orientation unexpectedly, leaving supportive states
and civil society groups to scramble to its side (Garvey 2010, 670). Although 26 other states
rushed to co-sponsor Brazil’s draft resolution, it met with stern opposition, primarily from
the Holy See and the Islamic bloc, but also from African countries (Girard 2004, 343–344).
Opponents of the resolution tried to avoid discussing the matter. When the resolution was
due for debate, on 24 April 2003, Pakistan proposed to end discussion of the resolution.
Pakistan’s no-action motion was defeated 24–22 (6 abstentions), with South Africa abstain-
ing. A stalling tactic followed: five Islamic countries each proposed extensive amendments
to Brazil’s resolution (UNCHR 2003d). The Libyan chairperson then cited a shortage of time
and proposed discussing the amendments at the CHR’s next meeting. Following a dispute
over procedure, the matter was put to a vote, with Brazil and other states friendly to the
resolution in favour of continuing the debate. However, it was decided, by a vote of 26–21
(6 abstentions) to postpone the discussion, with South Africa joining Islamic and other
African countries in favour of postponement (UNCHR 2003e, 12–14).
On the morning of 25 April, the last day of the CHR’s annual session, the matter was
postponed until the afternoon. Brazil acquiesced in the postponement, but noted that it
thought the previous day’s manoeuvring had been designed to avoid discussion of the
draft resolution (UNCHR 2003f, 2). When the resolution was finally considered late that
afternoon, the discussion was again ensnared in procedural debate. At 6 pm, the chair pro-
posed postponing consideration of Brazil’s resolution to the 2004 session of the CHR. Brazil
and its allies opposed postponement, but lost the vote 24–17, with South Africa and 9
other countries abstaining (UNCHR 2003g, 16–18). The failure to vote on the resolution
was a significant defeat because, according to some calculations, if a vote on the resol-
ution had taken place it might have passed with one vote (Girard 2004, 344–345).
At the CHR’s 2004 session, Brazil announced that it would not be tabling the resolution.
In the interim, Brazil had come under severe pressure from the Holy See, which had mobi-
lised domestic opposition to the issue, and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC),
which had threatened to boycott a trade summit between South American and Arab
countries that Brazil was planning to host (Girard 2004, 347). South Africa was approached,
in light of its constitution and its strong performance in Beijing, to take over the resolution,
but declined (Girard 2004, 347). With no state willing to take up the resolution at the 2005
session of the CHR, the draft resolution expired (Girard 2004, 350).
The sixteenth session of the HRC
The preceding discussion was not arranged according to a strict timeline, but it can be
seen that by 2010 South Africa had moved away from the international commitment to
the rights of sexual minorities it had shown in Beijing in 1995. In the 2000s, South
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Africa typically declined to speak or vote in support of the rights of LGBT persons, while
mild opposition to the cause marked the last years of the decade. South Africa’s two
votes, in 2008 and 2010, to remove the term ‘sexual orientation’ from the GA resolutions
on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions testify to this tendency, but there are also
other examples. In 2010, the Special Rapporteur on the right to health recommended to
the HRC the decriminalisation of consensual same-sex conduct and the repealing of
laws that discriminate on the basis of SOGI (UNHRC 2010a, 8). The African Group
refused to endorse the report and rejected the link between the decriminalisation of
sexual orientation and the right to health. The African Group further criticised the
special rapporteur for failing to address various other health problems in Africa as well
as the health aspects of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (Nigeria 2010). Cloak-
ing its statement in a reminder that its constitution prohibits discrimination based on
sexual orientation, South Africa nevertheless aligned itself with the African Group’s state-
ment. South Africa then merely ‘noted’ the special rapporteur’s recommendations, con-
firmed its commitment to the ‘sovereign equality of all states’, and spoke about what
the report should have included (reference to the MDGs and a discussion of marginalised
groups other than LGBT persons) (ISHR 2010; South Africa 2010a).
Another example relates to Durban process on racism. During negotiations on the draft
outcome document for the 2009 Durban Review Conference, a follow up to the World
Conference on Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance
(WCAR) held in Durban in 2001, South Africa opposed the inclusion of language on
SOGI (Sheill 2009, 319). Although the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action
(DDPA) addressed discrimination related to gender, debt bondage, human trafficking,
sexual exploitation, persons with disabilities and persons living with HIV/AIDS (UN
1995c), South Africa maintained that ‘sexual orientation and discrimination… goes
beyond the framework of the (2001) Durban Declaration’ (UN Watch 2009). In June
2010, the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xeno-
phobia and related intolerance stated that ‘the identity of each individual is made up of a
multitude of components, such as gender, age, nationality, profession, sexual orientation,
political opinion, religious affiliation and social origin’ (UNHRC 2010b). Citing the DDPA,
South Africa responded that the special rapporteur’s claim ‘demeans the legitimate
plight of the victims of racism’ (South Africa 2010b), a response ARC International, an
LGBT rights advocacy organisation, characterised as South Africa hitting ‘a new low’ (Fab-
ricius 2010). In fact, a lower low was soon to follow.
In March 2011, at the 16th session of the HRC, South Africa tabled a ‘very destructive’
and ‘extremely troubling’ text (ARC International 2011b; Western diplomat, Interview, 14
February 2014), draft resolution 16/L27, on sexual orientation (UNHRC 2011c). The decision
to present the draft resolution came from the mission in Geneva (African diplomat, Inter-
view, 12 March 2014), and reflected the influence of one particular South African diplomat
(below ambassadorial level) (Human rights activist, Interview, 20 February 2014). Draft res-
olution 16/L.27 tried to confine discussion of sexual orientation to a working group whose
job it would be to define this ‘new concept’ and its place in international human rights law.
Moreover, this working group would be ‘the single modality and framework…within
which all the deliberations on sexual orientation including other initiatives and action
shall be undertaken’, which meant that discussion of sexual orientation could not take
place throughout the UN system until the working group had finished its work (ARC
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International 2011c). The resolution set no deadline, so to get a sense of its potential dur-
ation one might compare it to the UNWorking Group on Indigenous Populations, as noted
by an African diplomat (Interview, 21 March 2014), which was in operation for 25 years.
Draft resolution 16/L.27 was an effort to arrest two ways in which sexual orientation was
increasingly being linked to human rights at the UN. The first of these, and the more
immediate reason for South Africa’s tabling of draft resolution 16/L.27, was a joint state-
ment, read by Colombia on behalf of 85 states, during the sixteenth session of the HRC
(Human rights activist, Interview, 20 February 2014). The Colombia statement expressed
concern about violence and other human rights violations committed against persons
because of their SOGI and called on states to end to such violations (ARC International
2011d).
After the failure of Brazil’s 2003 resolution on sexual orientation to get off the ground,
states began to use joint statements to draw attention to and express concern over vio-
lence against persons on the basis of sexual orientation and to build a foundation for a
future SOGI resolution (Karsay 2014, 8). The Colombia-led statement was the fourth in a
series of similar joint statements. The 2005 statement was made on behalf of 32 states,
the 2006 statement on behalf of 54, and the 2008 statement on behalf of 66. South
Africa was not a signatory to the first three statements – six African countries signed
the 2008 statement – but it did explain, limply, that, while not a signatory to the 2008
statement, it supported it (South Africa DIRCO 2009).
The second factor that prompted South Africa to table draft resolution 16/L.27 was its
unhappiness that references to sexual orientation were beginning to appear in various
aspects of the UN’s work. In December 2010 in the GA, South Africa, in a complaint
directed at Western countries, asserted that the ‘campaign by some delegations to
insert this issue into different draft resolutions in spite of its sensitive nature does not
help the cause at all’ (UNGA 2010b, 16). This, South Africa maintained, was a problem
because there was no agreed upon definition of sexual orientation and although the
notion enjoyed recognition within South Africa, it lacked the same recognition internation-
ally (UNGA 2010b, 16). The purpose of draft resolution 16/L.27 was therefore to define
sexual orientation and clarify its ‘scope and parameters in international human rights
law’ (UNHRC 2011c).
South Africa’s draft resolution was not only destructive in content; it was also tabled in
‘bad faith’ (Western diplomat, Interview, 14 February 2014). Breaking with expected HRC
practice, South Africa did not hold any open consultations on the draft resolution it was
planning to table, but instead held closed discussions with the African Group. South
Africa submitted its draft three minutes before the deadline, catching many delegations
by surprise (Western diplomat, Interview, 14 February 2014).
Neither the opponents nor the proponents of sexual orientation rights supported South
Africa’s initiative. Initially, South Africa wanted to submit draft resolution 16/L.27 on behalf
of the African Group, the unedited draft resolution still had ‘On behalf of the African Group’
typed at the top where it had been crossed out by hand and ‘South Africa’ written in its
place.8 During South Africa’s early discussions with African delegations in Geneva, South
Africa found them ‘happy’ with the text that was to become draft resolution 16/L.27.
However, after these initial discussions, African delegations received instruction to not
even raise the issue of sexual orientation at the HRC and to withdraw their sponsorship
of the draft resolution (African diplomat, Interview, 12 March 2014). Islamic states told
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South Africa to leave the sexual orientation issue to the West (Fabricius 2011). Among the
supporters of SOGI rights, various Western countries delivered demarches to Pretoria to
object to draft resolution 16/L.27 (Western diplomat, Interview, 14 February 2014), while
the United States threatened to submit a rival resolution (ISHR 2011). Furthermore, criti-
cism from civil society organisations, which expressed their dismay to South African offi-
cials in both Geneva and Pretoria, was telling (Human rights activist, Interview, 19 February
2014)
Isolated, South Africa deferred its draft. South Africa also announced that it would sign
the Colombia statement (South Africa 2011a), although it was only doing so under duress
(African diplomat, Interview, 12 March 2014). Draft resolution 16/L.27 represents a failure
of South African leadership and a clear attack on human rights.
Resolution 17/19
The evidence presented above demonstrated South Africa’s inconsistent positions on
SOGI rights at the UN as well as its declining support for these rights, reaching its nadir
with the tabling of draft resolution 16/L.27 in March 2011. After the deferral of draft res-
olution 16/L.27, South Africa performed a staggering about-turn, in the space of three
months going from leading an effort to obstruct SOGI rights to leading a resolution to
advance these rights.
South Africa returned to the HRC’s 17th session with a more open and consultative
approach and a more progressive draft resolution. The pro-SOGI lobby was still worried
about certain elements of South Africa’s new text (e.g. it still wanted to create a
working group) (UNHRC 2011d), but these were eventually excised from the draft. As
South Africa steered the resolution through the HRC, it faced strong opposition from
much of the African Group. Egypt tried to disrupt the first informal consultation on the res-
olution, while Nigeria, as coordinator of the African Group and therefore chair of the
Group’s meetings, obstructed discussion of the matter during Group meetings (African
diplomat, Interview, 12 March 2014). South Africa received requests from African and
Islamic countries to withdraw its resolution up to the last day of the 17th session
(African diplomat, Interview, 3 March 2014). Before the vote on the resolution, the Nigerian
ambassador, speaking for the African Group, said it ‘grieved his mind’ that no other African
country was with South Africa on this issue (Nigeria 2011). Nevertheless, the HRC adopted
resolution 17/19, with Mauritius voting in favour, Burkina Faso and Zambia abstaining, and
the other 10 African countries voting against. Most SOGI activists at the UN consider res-
olution 17/19 to be the most significant SOGI-related achievement at the UN to date
(Karsay 2014, 9).
South Africa’s new progressive approach represented a clear departure from its pos-
itions over the preceding decade, but after the deferral of draft resolution 16/L.27,
South Africa had only two options: a full withdrawal of the resolution, which would
have resulted in a loss of face, or tabling a new progressive text; the African Group’s
refusal to support draft resolution 16/L.27 put paid to another regressive resolution. As
South Africa considered what to do prior to the HRC’s 17th session, Ambassador Matjila
was influential in pushing for returning with a progressive resolution (African diplomat,
Interview, 12 March 2014). During the HRC’s 17th session, Matjila also played an essential
role in guiding Resolution 17/19 towards adoption (Western diplomat, Interview, 20
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February 2014). Although Matjila initially did not realise the extent of SOGI-based violence
and discrimination, he had a ‘genuine commitment’ to oppose such abuses (Human rights
activist, Interview, 20 February 2014).
After resolution 17/19
Resolution 17/19 may have been a major feat, but South Africa recognised that it had
‘ruffled the feathers’ of other African countries (Fabricius 2011). After resolution 17/19,
South Africa therefore went ‘to extraordinary lengths to engage other African countries’
(Radcliffe in Gevisser 2012). However, repairing relations was not that easy. For instance,
Senegal’s statement on behalf of the ‘majority of the member states of the African
Group’ during the panel discussion in March 2012 of the High Commissioner’s report
remained critical of South Africa (Senegal 2012). South Africa’s approach after resolution
17/19 was to pursue leadership on SOGI as well as smooth relations with the African
Group. South Africa tried to reconcile these seemingly incompatible goals by emphasising
dialogue, education, engagement and non-confrontation. However, as this section will
demonstrate, by mid-2013, South Africa again began to display the uneven and question-
able support for SOGI rights that had been evident before resolution 17/19. Moreover,
South Africa retreated from leadership on SOGI, sometimes acted against the advance-
ment of SOGI rights, and generally obstructed progress on the issue in the HRC.
After the completion of the tasks set by resolution 17/19, South Africa proposed, in June
2012, and as a first step, the holding of SOGI workshops in all five the UN regions before
April 2013. The second stage was to be ‘a decision or resolution within the Council’, which
‘should not be contingent on the timetable of regional meetings’ (South Africa 2012). Sig-
nificantly, by this time, Abdul Minty had replaced Jerry Matjila as ambassador. Many in
Geneva saw Minty as less committed to SOGI than his predecessor (Human rights activist,
Interview, 19 February 2014; Human rights activist, Interview, 20 February 2014; Western
diplomat, Interview, 20 February 2014).
In April 2013, South Africa and Norway hosted a conference in Oslo to summarise the
preceding regional workshops. However, at the Oslo conference it emerged that there had
been no African workshop. It was assumed that South Africa was organising it (Human
rights activist, Interview, 18 February 2014), but the failure to hold a meeting in Africa
was never publicly explained. According to one African diplomat, the problem was
funding. Norway had offered to pay, but their money was unacceptable since it would
have looked like the West promoting its values in Africa. Apparently, South Africa could
not find the money because the financial year was already underway and such a workshop
had not been budgeted for (African diplomat, Interview, 12 March 2014). A second
problem to emerge in Oslo was South African anger at Norway which South Africa saw
as ‘crossing its tracks’ (Western diplomat, Interview, 14 February 2014). Specifically,
Norway wanted the summary workshop to be seen as part of an ‘Oslo process’ (African
diplomat, Interview, 12 March 2014). Thirdly, there were already signs of disagreement
over how to proceed. The UN Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights outlined
two possible paths:
Should we back off and until we have consensus among states or at least a broader accep-
tance that LGBT rights violations require a response? Or should we press on in spite of the
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controversy, laying out the facts, drawing attention to the suffering, the violence and the dis-
crimination that continues day after day? (Šimonović 2013, 39)
In their combined concluding summary, the two chairs of the meeting – Norway and
South Africa – mentioned only the creation of ‘a relevant mechanism, at the appropriate
time’, but it was clear that Norway wanted this mechanism to be created soon (Saetre
2013, 3).
Before the June 2013 session of the HRC there was clamour for a follow-up SOGI resol-
ution (Pillay 2013, 32). There were also expectations that South Africa might present such a
resolution, but South Africa quashed these before the session. There could be no resol-
ution, South Africa maintained, until there had been an African workshop. One week
into the session, South Africa called a meeting in which it stressed the need for more dia-
logue, leaving Western and Latin American states very frustrated (Human rights activist,
Interview, 18 February 2014). South Africa drew on a disagreement among civil society
groups over whether to push for special procedures mechanism on SOGI or whether to
follow, as CAL (2013) proposed, ‘an incremental approach’ based on dialogue and the pro-
vision of technical assistance to justify its own inaction (Human rights activist, Interview, 20
February 2014). South Africa stated that the African workshop was to take place before the
end of 2013, with a concluding conference in Geneva in early 2014, but gave no indication
of when there would be a new HRC resolution (Human rights activist, Interview, 20 Febru-
ary 2014). One reason for South Africa’s caginess was that it was planning to stand in the
elections for Council membership in November 2013 (Human rights activist, Interview, 20
February 2014). A palpable commitment to the international promotion of LGBT rights
before the membership vote, such as hosting a regional workshop or sponsoring a resol-
ution on the topic, would have put South Africa at a disadvantage (Western diplomat,
Interview, 14 February 2014; Human rights activist, Interview, 20 February 2014).
At the HRC’s June 2013 session, the disagreement between Norway and South Africa
over how to advance the SOGI matter came into the open. Norway had approached
Brazil and South Africa to make a joint statement on SOGI before the plenary of the
HRC. South Africa drew up the first draft, but Norway dismissed this as ‘weak’ and declared
itself unwilling to agree to South Africa’s incremental approach (African diplomat, Inter-
view, 12 March 2014). Astonishingly, South Africa, the leader on SOGI, did not join the
Norway’s SOGI statement, which it made on behalf of 33 countries, mostly from Latin
America and the West. Norway cited the conclusions of the Oslo conference in April
2013, which South Africa had co-chaired (Norway 2013a, 5), specifically the ‘need to inte-
grate the issues systematically in the work of the United Nations, through the establish-
ment of a relevant mechanism, at the appropriate time’ (Norway 2013b). Norway’s
statement did not go beyond the April 2013 statement by the Norwegian and South
African co-chairs; the crucial parts were lifted almost verbatim, yet South Africa responded
angrily.
In its reply, South Africa addressed Norway directly, an act deemed ‘almost offensive’ by
HRC standards (Western diplomat, Interview, 20 February 2014). South Africa (2013)
explained that it could not join the Norwegian statement because of a ‘difference of
opinion between those who feel the need to adopt immediate measures and those
that need to promote further interaction and cooperation on how we move forward in
a progressive and systematic manner’. In other words, South Africa was now retreating
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from what it had endorsed two months before (South Africa 2012). As for the elusive
African workshop, recall that in June 2012 South Africa (2012) had said that further
action in the HRC should not depend on when the regional meetings were held.
However, now South Africa (2013) seemed to be doing just that, stating that it ‘is of the
firm belief that Africa’s views need to be heard’. To make this happen, ‘South Africa is com-
mitted to the convening of the African Regional Workshop and a High-Level Seminar in
Geneva in order to share experiences and promote cooperation’ (South Africa 2013).
South Africa did not commit to any dates and steered clear of any mention of a resolution.
By insisting on an African workshop, South Africa was in effect making a case to put the
fate of a future SOGI resolution in the hands of African states, many of which were
opposed to a workshop and resistant to SOGI rights.
The HRC’s June 2013 session demonstrated South Africa’s isolation and brought to the
fore disagreements over how to proceed on the SOGI issue. However, the pro-SOGI camp
could not simply to jettison South Africa. There was wide agreement among civil society
and pro-SOGI delegations a non-Western state should lead on SOGI, but it was also known
that no developing country was willing to take over from South Africa (Human rights acti-
vist, Interview, 29 May 2015). Moreover, as an African country, South Africa was the perfect
advertisement for the universality of SOGI rights (Western diplomat, Interview, 20 February
2014). Moreover, by giving the impression that it was poised to do what it has promised,
South Africa extended others’ patience. During a meeting between Argentina, South Africa
and an LGBT advocacy group during the September 2013 session, South Africa said that
there would be an African regional meeting in December 2013 and a high-level conclud-
ing meeting in Geneva early in 2014. Significantly, South Africa said it intended to bring a
resolution at the March 2014 session and, when asked, said that this was indeed their offi-
cial position. However, by mid-November 2013 South Africa was saying that organising the
African workshop before the year’s end would be tough (Human rights activist, Interview,
18 February 2014).
At the HRC’s March 2014 session, with the African workshop still not held, South Africa
did not table a resolution on SOGI as it previously said it would. During the ‘high-level
segment’ of the session, South Africa’s foreign minister delivered a statement. The original
written version of her speech said, ‘South Africa is committed to host[ing] the African
regional seminar focusing on the plight of the LGBT during the first half of this year’
(quoted in DeBarros 2014). However, the minister left out this part when she spoke, an
omission that was put down to a lack of time, but really because she had wanted the
details of this workshop to be more concrete before making a public commitment
(African diplomat, Interview, 12 March 2014). The online version of her speech was even-
tually changed and the commitment to a regional workshop deleted (Nkoana-Mashabane
2014).
The March 2014 session took place at a time of heightened persecution of LGBT persons
in Nigeria, Russia, Uganda and elsewhere (Amnesty International 2014; Elder 2013; Hazle-
wood 2014). During the high-level segment, 12 countries mentioned the plight of LGBT
persons, with some criticising the ‘hateful laws’ in the aforementioned countries (ARC
International 2014b, 9). South Africa’s foreign minister, her country supposedly the
leader on SOGI, said nothing on the matter because such ‘confrontation’ was beyond
the pale. One reason why South Africa did not to table a SOGI resolution in March 2014
was because South Africa did not want it to be seen as a reaction to Uganda’s persecution
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of LGBT persons (Human rights activist, Interview, 5 March 2014; African diplomat, Inter-
view, 12 March 2014).
The 26th session of the HRC
By mid-2014, South Africa’s failure to organise the African regional workshop, its unrea-
lised promises of a new SOGI resolution, South Africa’s failure to speak out against repres-
sion against sexual minorities, its latterly added insistence that a new SOGI resolution was
dependent on the holding of an African workshop, and its withdrawal from the ‘Friends of
SOGI’ group of delegations in Geneva raised serious doubts about South Africa’s leader-
ship and its commitment to advancing SOGI rights through the UN. Then, during the
HRC’s June 2014 session, South Africa firmly supported an initiative Human Rights
Watch (2014b) described as ‘an insidious attempt to undermine the universality of
human rights, and specifically the rights of women and LGBT people’. At issue was
Egypt’s ‘Protection of the family’ draft resolution (UNHRC 2014b). In defining the family,
the sponsors deliberately excluded language from previous UN documents that recog-
nised ‘that in different cultural, political and social systems, various forms of the family
exist’ (ISHR 2014a). The concern among LGBT groups was that Egypt’s narrow definition
of the family would be used in later negotiations to deny LGBT couples certain rights
(Feder 2014). Before the vote on Egypt’s draft resolution, which was co-sponsored by 66
states ‘including the whole African Group’ (Egypt 2014), European and Latin American
states tabled an amendment to include the recognition of various family forms (UNHRC
2014c). However, before a debate and a vote on the amendment could take place,
Russia proposed a summary end to the discussion. Russia’s no-action motion won 22–
20 (6 abstentions), with South Africa voting with Russia. The unamended anti-LGBT resol-
ution was then adopted 26–14 (6 abstentions), with South Africa voting in favour (ISHR
2014b).
The 27th session of the HRC
At the start of the September 2014 HRC session, after more than three years without a new
SOGI resolution, Chile, Colombia and Uruguay announced that they would table such a
resolution (UNHRC 2014d). Would South Africa support it? South Africa’s behaviour
since June 2011, especially its anti-SOGI vote in June 2014, suggested that it would not.
On the other hand, the new draft resolution was clearly intended as a follow up to resol-
ution 17/19. Various journalists and activists picked up on South Africa’s ambivalence
(Human Rights Watch 2014a; Sonke Gender Justice 2014; Thamm 2014). South Africa
gave no indication of its intentions. Consider the strange case of ambassador Minty,
going to an ‘informal’ (a meeting where diplomats work on the details of a resolution)
on the new SOGI text. It was highly unusual for ambassadors to attend ‘informals’,
made more so by Minty not saying a word or giving any indication how South Africa
was planning to vote (Western diplomat, Interview, 27 May 2015).
As it turned out, South Africa voted for the resolution and also opposed the seven
hostile amendments brought against it. However, those votes are not proof of South
Africa’s strong support for SOGI rights. The original draft asked the High Commissioner
to report biennially on violence and discrimination on the basis of SOGI. South Africa
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was one of the states that successfully lobbied for a weakening of this requirement (China
and India also did) (Interview, Latin American diplomat, 29 May 2015), with the result that
the final resolution only asked for a once-off report. Furthermore, after the vote, South
Africa included a parting shot at Western states, claiming that ‘the spirit of this resolution
is in stark contrast to the unhelpful and divisive use of development aid by some countries
as a means to shift policies and laws in a select number of countries’ (South Africa 2014).
The 29th session of the HRC
By June 2015, South Africa had fallen out of the leadership on SOGI, demonstrated weak-
ening support for the cause, and returned to the inconsistency that marked its positions
prior to resolution 17/19. One piece of inconsistency was to follow, albeit this time in
favour of SOGI rights. At the June 2015 HRC session, South Africa’s opposed the ‘Protection
of the family’ resolution, which South Africa had supported the year before. According to
one observer, South Africa reversal was the result of input from the South Africa’s Depart-
ment of Social Development (Davis 2015). As in 2014, the 2015 draft resolution excluded
language that recognised the diversity of family forms (UNHRC 2015a). In response, South
Africa, alongside Brazil, Chile and Uruguay, proposed adding language that recognised
that ‘in different cultural, political and social systems, various forms of the family exist’
(UNHRC 2015b). South Africa’s amendment was met with a motion to end debate on
this amendment. SOGI rights opponents won by a single vote. The resolution was
adopted by a vote of 29–14 (4 abstentions, which South Africa, in a strong statement in
support of SOGI rights, voted against).
Conclusion
This article has presented South Africa’s positions on SOGI at the UN. How does the
inclusion of these facts affect our general assessment of South Africa’s human rights
foreign policy? The first few years of the Mandela presidency were when South Africa
was most committed to the international advancement of human rights. South Africa’s
strong pro-human rights contribution at the 1995 Beijing’s Women’s Conference provides
one more piece of evidence to confirm this view. The 2000s were a time when the place
human rights in South African foreign policy were diminished to such an extent that a
columnist in the Washington Post described South Africa as a ‘rogue democracy’, a
country that devalues and weakens the freedoms of others (Gerson 2008). Apart from a
2006 vote in the GA, South Africa’s actions during this period, which culminated in the
March 2011 attack on sexual orientation rights in the HRC, deserve the Washington
Post’s severe judgement. South Africa’s central role in leading the UN to adopt its first-
ever SOGI resolution in June 2011 is a highlight of South Africa’s recent human rights
diplomacy as well as of human rights at the UN. South Africa’s recent human rights
foreign policy comes out looking less dismal once we take into account the country’s lea-
dership on resolution 17/19.
South Africa’s contradictory behaviour subsequent to resolution 17/19 complicates an
assessment of this period. On the negative side, South Africa voted for the June 2014
anti-SOGI ‘Protection of the family’ resolution, lobbied for the watering down of the
2014 SOGI resolution, failed to criticise regimes that persecute LGBT persons, and
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dragged its feet while leader on SOGI. On the positive side, and with the exception of the
2014 ‘Protection of the family’ resolution, South Africa voted in support of the pro-SOGI
options whenever these came up in the GA and HRC. South Africa’s post-resolution 17/
19 record thus left room for improvement, but it was nevertheless positive compared
South Africa’s general human rights foreign policy over this period. It seems likely that
these two trajectories – moderately strong support for SOGI rights and faltering inter-
national support for human rights in general – will continue on their parallel and contra-
dictory paths. What also seems likely, based on evidence over more than 20 years, is that
South Africa will continue to behave inconsistently on the theme of sexual orientation and
human rights.
Despite being well placed to exercise leadership on SOGI matters at the UN, South
Africa only stepped into such a role in early 2011. A few comments are in order. South
African leadership on resolution 17/19 was a major accomplishment, but this success
had its roots in a South African miscalculation and an attempt to suppress human
rights; it was hardly the outcome of a long-term vision. Second, frequently in discussions
of South African foreign policy, South African leadership is viewed as a good in itself with
little attention to the content of the initiative. South Africa’s draft resolution 16/L27, an
anti-human rights action, is a reminder that not all leadership is morally worthy.
Perhaps it is also necessary to reflect on the morality of other aspects of South Africa’s
international leadership, such as its association with the Global South. Finally, on SOGI,
South Africa displayed typical middle power leadership by acting as catalyst, mediator
and bridge-builder. Draft resolution 16/L.27 was intended to strike a balance between
South Africa’s constitutional provisions and the African Group (African diplomat, Interview,
12 March 2014), while a central aim of South Africa’s June 2012 SOGI plan was to reduce
polarisation over the issue. However, South Africa largely failed to accomplish such middle
power goals. On draft resolution 16/L.27, South Africa ended up isolated and had to with-
draw its initiative. Resolution 17/19 was adopted in a charged atmosphere, while the panel
discussion of the report commissioned by resolution 17/19 saw a walk out from Islamic
countries. South Africa’s plan after resolution 17/19 to reduce polarisation and opposition
to SOGI made little headway. The result for South Africa was paralysis, isolation and event-
ual retreat from leadership. These failures should give pause to those confident of South
Africa’s ability to be a global leader.
Notes
1. South Africa could not vote because it was not a member of the HRC at the time.
2. Interviews took place between February and May 2014 and in May 2015.
3. Brief mentions of sexual orientation and human rights in discussions of South African foreign
policy can be found in (2013); Jordaan (2014a, 116–117) and Jordaan (2015, 476–477). For
overviews of human rights in South African foreign policy, see Barber (2004), Brysk (2009),
Graham (2013), Smith (2015, 2016).
4. The HRC replaced the CHR in 2006.
5. The CHR had 53 members, 15 from the African Group.
6. No African countries opposed the amendment, while only 2 abstained. The overall vote on the
amendment was 79–70 (17 abstentions).
7. The vote on the amendment was 93–53 (27 abstentions).
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